shows that the identifiability thesis does not hold in the generality claimed by Frege. Frege's argument will be reconstructed within a model-theoretic framework. However, due to the particular features of Frege's system, the following modifications of the usual model-theoretic procedure are necessary:
(1) Truth-values are objects in the sense that they belong to the range of quantifiers and that they can be arguments of the identity function like any other object. Syntactically this means that first-level function names can be combined even with names of truth-values as argument signs; e.g., the sentence '-^(α = α)' may occur to the right or left of the identity sign '='. In particular, '=' can function as a sentence connective. 5 (2) Closed abstracts (i.e., expressions of the form 'eΦ(e)' without free variables) are the smallest semantic units; an interpretation will be an assignment of objects to closed abstracts. Thus closed abstracts function as the only nonlogical constants of the language being considered here. 6 This view is chosen because nothing is assumed about courses-of-values: If in the definition of the value of an expression under an interpretation one wanted to take into account the internal structure of abstracts, one would already have to presuppose that closed abstracts are used to denote sets and in particular that the abstraction principle (Frege's Basic Law V) holds. But this is just what is not intended. We want to investigate which interpretations are compatible with the abstraction principle and which are not.
The language
When constructing a model-theoretic semantics, we must first specify the language to be interpreted semantically. We use the means of expression provided by Frege in the first nine sections of the "Basic Laws". That is, we use a language with the horizontal ('-'), the negation-sign ('-r') and the identity-sign ('=') as function symbols, the first-order universal quantifier ('-v^'), and the abstraction-sign for courses-of-values ('''). In doing so, we restrict ourselves to the first-order subsystem of the system developed in the "Basic Laws" containing course-of-values abstraction but not second-order quantification. This is justified because in Section 10 Frege argues for his identifiability thesis solely on the basis of the system he has thus far developed. 7 We follow Frege's original notation fairly closely, but in some places we use a terminology that is more modern. Furthermore we distinguish between metalinguistic (i.e., syntactical) variables and signs of the object-language, and use, following Quine, quasi-quotation marks <Γ ' and <π ' to refer to the result of a concatenation of signs which are themselves partly referred to by syntactical variables.
Symbols of the language under consideration are:
( respectively. Outer brackets may be omitted. Note that our way of bracketing is somewhat different from Frege's.
A formula is a term of the form r -A~1, 
The rank of a term is defined as follows:
(1) Parameters, abstracts, T and ± are of rank 0. This definition of "rank" underlies the inductive definition of the following semantics. Abstracts are of rank 0, because, if closed, they are counted as smallest semantic units. T and ± are given rank 0 in order to have, in every case, standard names of rank 0 at our disposal not only for courses-of-values, but also for truth-values.
Semantics
A structure 21 is a triple (U, t, f), where Uis a set, called the domain of 2ί (also denoted by '|2l|'), and where t and/are two distinct elements of U 9 called the truth-values of 2ί (also denoted by 'V and %\ respectively). An interpretation β in 21 is a mapping from the set of all closed abstracts to U, such that 3(6) U {t,f} = U. (I.e., at most / and/are not values of closed abstracts under β.) The elements of 3 (6) are called the courses-of-values under β.
Let an interpretation β in 21 be given. A mapping 5ί* from the set of all closed terms onto U, called the extension of β 9 is inductively defined as follows: One could object to this semantics that the universal quantifier is interpreted substitutionally, i.e. with reference to the instances of the quantified formula, and not (as in Frege's introduction of the quantifiers in Section 8 of the "Basic Laws") referentially, i.e. with reference to the objects of the domain. This is not a problem because we assume that, for all elements of the domain, names are at our disposal in the formal language: It holds that 0*(C U {T, ±}) = |2ί|. The assumption that each object can be denoted is certainly not un-Fregean. A referential interpretation of quantification is not possible within our framework, because closed abstracts are smallest semantic units and open abstracts cannot be interpreted satisfactorily, not even with respect to a valuation of parameters. Terms cannot be semantically decomposed down to the level of parameters. (In this section we use Frege's original notation 'eΦ(e)' for abstracts.) Frege did not yet have at his disposal the model-theoretic way of speaking about signs and their denotations, in particular not the strict distinction between object-language and metalanguage. In model-theoretic argumentations one talks about signs as well as about objects in the metalanguage without using any expression of the object-language. We can, for example, say that the object ω! is assigned to 6 iΦ(eY by the interpretation β\ 9 and that ω 2 is assigned to the same sign 'eΦίe)' by the interpretation ύ 2 -I n doing so we use 'ωi' and 'ω 2 ' as metalinguistic names for objects which have nothing to do with the signs of the object-language. Frege, however, also uses, when speaking about courses-of-values, signs of the object-language like 'e'Φ(e)' as names. According to Frege, 'eΦ(e)' is always a name for the object e*Φ(e), which means that for Frege closed abstracts are always names with courses-of-values as fixed denotations. Thus Frege is, strictly speaking, not in a position to discuss the nonuniqueness of the denotations of abstracts as he does in Section 10 of the "Basic Laws". If 6 eΦ(eY denotes the course-of-values €*Φ(e), then one cannot even formulate that another denotation of 'eΦ(e)' is consistent with the abstraction principle. In not only mentioning but also using abstracts throughout his investigations, Frege presupposes their denotative relationship to fixed objects. (This is not the case with sentences and truth-values: Here Frege never uses signs of the object-language (such as '^-(α = α)' or '-r-^2/-(α = α)') in order to refer to the truth-values, but always the metalinguistic names 'the True' and 'the False'!)
In order to treat this problem nevertheless, Frege uses another sort of term, which he writes as 'eΦ(e)'. 8 He expresses the view that the abstraction principle determines no unique model but admits different interpretations ύ\ and β 2 where, e.g., tfi('eΦ(e)') = ω x and £f 2 ('eΦ(€)') s ω 2 about as follows: In addition to terms 'e'Φ(e)' we may introduce terms 'rjΦiηY by the abstraction principle "without the identity of eΦ(e) and rjφ(η) being derivable from this" ( [3] , p. 17).
9 That means, instead of directly speaking metalinguistically about different objects, he introduces new signs into the object-language and uses them within his metalinguistic reflections as names for objects.
Since in our model-theoretic investigations a sign of the object-language can never be used, there is no reason for us to introduce a new kind of abstract. Rather, from this point of view, two languages, whose abstracts are formed with ''' and '~', respectively, appear to be identifiable: The form of the symbols of the object-language is quite unimportant.
The permutation argument
According to the previous section we need not take into account Frege's distinction between abstracts of different forms. So we propose the following reconstruction of his permutation argument: Let an interpretation βι in the structure 21 ΞΞ (U, t,f) be given. Let ω 1 and ω 2 be different courses-of-values under β u i.e., ωi Φ ω 2 and α^ s-
Letp F be the permutation of U which is defined as follows:
That is, p F interchanges t and/with ωi and ω 2 , respectively, and leaves other arguments unchanged. Let 93 be the structure <t/, ω u ω 2 ) and β 2 the interpretation in S3 which is defined as follows: β 2 Then the assertion can be inferred as follows:
We prove (*) by induction on the rank of C. 
*(T) = $i{A) and 3 2 (±) = 3i(B), which means that A and B must under β 2 denote the truth-values of 93 (which are, according to our semantics, assigned to T and _L). So the transition from the interpretation 3\ in (U, t,f) to the interpretation ύ 2 in <£/, p F (t), p F (f))
by means of p F does not contribute anything to the goal of determining certain abstracts to be names of the truth-values, because the truth-values are transformed by p F as well. This argument is obviously independent of the specific choice of p F and holds for all permutations p of |2ί|.
One could object to our formulation of Theorem 1 that Frege's permutation argument only concerns the domain U of 21 but not the structure 21 itself, i.e., the interpretation of sentences by truth-values. This means that although β 2 is defined as p ° β\ for a permutation /?, β 2 should remain an interpretation in the same structure 21 (i.e.,
in (U, t,/> instead of (U, p(t),p(f))).
In other words, even under £f 2 *, sentences should be interpreted by t and/, as under β*, and not by p(t) and p(f).
In fact, the stated objections would become superfluous if Theorem 1, or at least its special case for p F (6)). Another possibility would be to consider β 2 an interpretation in <(/', t,f) for V c £/. But not even this method would be viable. Not only no permutation but even no mapping exists which has the desired property, as the following theorem demonstrates.
Theorem 2 Let u { be an interpretation in 21 = <(/, t 9 f) which is a model of the abstraction principle. Let h be a mapping from U to ί/, such that h{ω { ) = t for an ω { E $ι(Q) which is different from t. Let β 2 be the interpretation h o β x in <£/', t, f) for U f = h(e x (e)) U {tj} c U. Then β 2 is not a model of the abstraction principle.
Proof: Let A be a closed abstract such that β\(A) = ω\. Then β { f = Γ e(-A = e) = e(X = e)~\ since, because of ω { Ψ t (which implies β*( Γ -A" 1 ) =/), it holds that β x N Γ -^((-,4 = α) = (X = α))" 1 . However, it does not hold that
On the other hand we have 0 2 N Γ e(-^4 = e) = e(X = e) π , because from β { ( Γ e(-A = e) π ) s fl^^ίx = e)" 1 ) it follows that Λ(0 1 ( Γ e(~^=e) π )) Ξ Λ(ίί 1 ( Γ e(X = e)" 1 )), i.e., β 2 ( Γ e(-A = e) π ) £ J 2 ( r 6(X=e) n ). A corresponding theorem can be proved for h(ω 2 ) =/for ω 2 E £J 2 (C), Theorem 2 shows that it is not possible to create a 'new' interpretation in 21, which is a model of the abstraction principle and under which Γ A = T π is valid for a closed abstract A, by simply adding a transformation of the domain of 2ί to a given interpretation in 21 which is a model of the abstraction principle and under which A does not denote the True. Roughly speaking: Transformation of the domain is not sufficient for stipulating a closed abstract to be a name for the True.
Frege's aim can, however, be understood in yet another way. Whereas Theorem 2 dealt with the problem of reinterpreting closed abstracts A and B as names of the truth-values t and/of a given model, one could try to interpret A and B as names for the True and the False, independent of how truth-values were specified in a previously given model. More precisely, let an interpretation ύ γ in 21 = (U, /,/>, which is a model of the abstraction principle, and let closed abstracts A, B be given such that $i(A) Φ $\(B). Then an interpretation β 2 in 33 = <£/', 3iG4), β x (B)), for U' c 3i((B), is to be construed in such a way that β 2 (A) = 3i(A) and $ 2 {B) = $\{B). In this case we would obtain as desired β 2 N Γ A = T π and ϋ 2 | = r B = X~\ However, this purpose too cannot (in nontrivial cases) be reached by simply adding to ϋ\ a transformation h from U to #i(G), as can be shown analogously to Theorem 2:
Theorem 3
Let ϋι be an interpretation in 21 = (U, t 9 f), wΛ/cΛ /s # model of the abstraction principle. Let A, B be closed abstracts such that t Φ β 1 
(A) and βι(A) Φ β { (B). Let h be a mapping from U to β x (Q) such that h{β x {A)) = $ι(A). Let β 2 be the interpretation h
Then β 2 is not a model of the abstraction principle.
Proof: As in the proof of Theorem 2 we consider the closed abstracts Γ e(-A = e)" 1 and Γ e(X = e) n . By the abstraction principle and t Φ $\(A) (which implies β*( r -A n ) =/), β 1 ( r e(-A=e)' 1 ) = 3i( Γ e'(X = e) n ) holds, and therefore Λ(£J 1 ( Γ € '(-A = e) π )) = Λ(£l 1 ( Γ e(X = e) π )), i.e. β 2 ( Γ i(-A = e)" 1 ) Ξ 3 2 ( Γ e(X = e)" 1 ). However, it does not hold that
π , because 3 2 *(^) Ξ MA) = A^M)) = 5^^), therefore 3 2 *( Γ -^Ί) = £Jj(yl), but 3 2 *(X) = S^JΪ) # β^A).
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A corresponding result can be proved if one assumes/^ $\{B) instead of t Ψ e x (A) and h(3 γ {B)) s β x (B) instead of h(β x (A)) = β { (A).
From a given model of the abstraction principle no model of the abstraction principle can be construed just by transforming its domain, such that two given courses-of-values of the 'old' model are truth-values of the 'new' model and are at the same time denoted by the 'old' abstracts.
The proofs of Theorems 2 and 3 show that the stipulation of closed abstracts as names for the True and the False, together with the abstraction principle, has the effect that closed abstracts which have the same denotation, can lose their synonymity:
Γ e(-A = e) π and Γ e(i. = e) π have the same denotation as long as A does not denote the True, but obtain different denotations if A is defined to be a name of the True. If one wants to transform a model of the abstraction principle into a new model of the abstraction principle where a closed abstract which has not denoted the True in the 'old' model now denotes the True, then one has to proceed in such a way that abstracts which are synonymous under the old interpretation can receive different denotations under the new interpretation. This is not possible by simply mapping the domain of a structure. Such mappings can transform several objects into one (and so closed abstracts with different denotations into synonymous ones), but not one object into several (and so synonymous closed abstracts into closed abstracts with different denotations).
This does not mean that Frege's identifiability thesis is wrong but only that his permutation argument cannot serve as a foundation for it. It can, however, be shown in our framework that the identifiability thesis does not hold in full generality, namely that not any two arbitrary closed abstracts A, B which denote different courses-of-values can be defined to be names of the truth-values. This example shows that there are closed abstracts A and B that have different denotations in a model β { of the abstraction principle but that receive the same denotation in any model ϋ 2 of the abstraction principle, in which A is used as a name for the True (i.e., 3 2 
(A) = $ 2 (T)).
Thus they are not suitable as candidates for names of truth-values, since the True must be different from the False.
This leads to the question of which necessary and sufficient conditions closed abstracts must satisfy, so that for each given model β x of the abstraction principle there is a model β 2 of the abstraction principle in which A and B are names of truth-values, i.e., for which β 2 \= Γ A = T π and β 2 f = Γ B = ± n hold. As has been shown, it is not sufficient that A and B have different denotations under 3 { (i.e., 3\(A) Ψ $\(B)). It is not even obvious that this is a necessary condition, for it seems that it cannot be precluded that β 2 An even more basic question is whether there is a model of the abstraction principle at all and whether in such a model closed abstracts A and B can denote the truth-values. This problem does not concern the conditions A and B have to fulfill, with respect to a given model ΰ { of the abstraction principle, in order to become names for the truth-values in another model 0 2 of the abstraction principle, but the initial construction of such a model. The inconsistency of Frege's second-order system is no argument against the existence of a model because we have confined ourselves to its first-order part including the abstraction principle. Since in this restricted system the elementhood-relation (which is crucial for the derivation of the antinomy) is not definable, we have assumed its consistency throughout this paper. 4. For example, the incompleteness of the first-order part of Frege's formalism; cf. Thiel [5] .
5. This is overlooked by Resnik ([4] , p. 209) who in his short presentation of the permutation argument considers only courses-of-values but not truth-values to belong to the domain of the model he assumes to be given.
6. In particular, our language contains no descriptive function or predicate symbols. Thus no conflict arises between Frege's central claim that denotations of function symbols are functions rather than objects and the model-theoretic way of assigning objects to descriptive symbols.
7. It seems difficult to carry over our approach to the full second-order system of the "Basic Laws" because then, in order to deal with second-order quantifiers, we would need denotations of predicate or function symbols, something which is avoided here (see note 6). Besides that, results would probably become trivial since, due to the inconsistency of this second-order system, no model of the abstraction principle would exist.
8. To be exact, Frege would have to write something like '€Φ(e)\ where 'Φ(e)' results from 'Φ(€)' by throughout replacing ' *' by *~\ 9. In English, see [2] , p. 47).
10. At the beginning of "Basic Laws", Section 10, Frege gives an argument which is in some respect similar to the later one and whose assertion can be reformulated as follows: Let 2ί and 93 be structures with the same truth-values (i.e., t% = t%, f% = fsβ) and g be a one-one mapping from |H| onto |93| leaving the truth-values fixed {i.e., g(t%) = t%, g(Λ) = /$). Let $ι be an interpretation in 5ί and β 2 be the interpretation g ° β x in 93. Then for each term D: $ x \= D iff ύ 2 1= D. This argument, which can be proved similarly to Theorem 1 and which shows that the abstraction principle does not completely determine a range of objects, differs from the permutation argument in that |$l| and |53| may be different but that the truth-values must remain fixed.
11. It is not even necessary to require in Theorem 3 that h(βγ{A)) = $ι(A). It suffices to assume the existence of a closed abstract C such that h(β { (C)) s= βι(A) and βι(C) Φ t, and to consider Γ e(-C = e)" 1 instead of Γ e(-A = e)" 1 in the proof.
12. T. Parsons has now established this consistency (see his contribution to this issue).
